Michigan Law Review
Volume 41

Issue 3

1942

THE VALIDITY OF CONDITIONS IN PATENT LICENSES
John Barker Waite
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John B. Waite, THE VALIDITY OF CONDITIONS IN PATENT LICENSES, 41 MICH. L. REV. 419 (1942).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1942]

CONDITIONS IN PATENT LICENSES

THE VALIDITY OF CONDITIONS IN PATENT LICENSES
John Barker Waite*

I

N discussing this subject one can still begin with the premise that in
this country a patentee possesses the absolute right to preclude
anyone, except the United States government, froin making use of his
invention. The government is an exception l?ecause of the statute to the
effect that whenever his invention is
"· .. used or manufactured by or for the United States without
license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture
the same, such owner's remedy shall be by suit against the United
States in the Court of Claims for the recovery of his reasonable
and entire compensation for such use and manufacture." 1
Though even as against the government the patentee has a right to
compensation, he would not, under this provision, be allowed to enjoin
the government's use and therefore, to that extent, does not have an
absolute right of exclusion. But against all others his right appears to
be still absolute.
In the Paper Bag Patent case of 1908 2 the Supreme Court, without
dissent, laid down the flat proposition, as stated in the syllabus, that

" ... An inventor receives from a patent the right to exclude
others from its use for the time prescribed in the statute, and this
right is not dependent on his using the device or affected by his
non-use thereof, and, except in a case where the public-interest is
involved, the remedy of injunction to prevent infringement of his
patent will not be denied merely on the ground of non-user of
the invention."
This doctrine has been repeatedly attacked in Congress. In 1912
the "Oldfield Bill" 8 would have required a patentee who was making
no use of the invention himself to permit its use by others on payment
of a reasonable royalty. At the Congressional hearing on the bill inventors of note and patent attorneys testified that deliberate nonuse or
suppression of inventions whose use would be beneficial to the public
was practically nonexistent. The Oldfield Bill was defeated, but the

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.-Ed.
36 Stat. L. 851 (1910), as amended, 35 U.S. C. (1940), § 68.
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 28 S. Ct.
748 (1908).
8 H. R. 23,417, 62d Cong., and again in 1913, H. R. 1700, 63d Cong.
1
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proposal has been perennially revived in one form or another. In 1939
Mr. Willis B. Rice 4 advocated the creation of a "Patents Commission"
which should have power, among others, to order the granting of
licenses by patentees when necessary to the public interest. Just recently
the Department of Justice, through Mr. Thurman Arnold, has accused
patentees, acting through international cartels, of serious injury to the
position of the United States at the beginning of the war in respect of
its facilities for manufacture of artificial rubber. Whether the lack of
provision for its manufacture at this time is in truth attributable to the
refusal of the patentees to license its production in this country, or, as
appears the more probable, was the consequence of high cost of production and the financial unwisdom of the necessary capital expenditures in competition with cheap natural rubber supplies, has not been
critically considered by the press and the public generally.
Out of the situation there may evolve, wisely or otherwise, some
radical change in the patent law, including a statutory limitation upon
the right of patentees to exclude others from use of their inventions. 5
But at the present time the law appears still to be as it was laid down
by the Supreme Court in the Paper Bag case.
THE PROBLEM

TI_ie problem of the patentee's right of exclusion therefore becomes
a question of what limitations and restrictions he can impose upon
licensees to whom he voluntarily opens his monopoly in some degree.
Since he can exclude them absolutely, does it follow that he can admit
them only to such an extent, and only upon such conditions as he may
choose? By this phrase "Can he?" is meant only "are the courts likely
to sustain the validity of such a condition, in so far as that likelihood
can be deduced from existing judicial opinions?" Unlike the writer
of the Temporary National Economic Committee monograph referred to in a previous footnote, the present writer is not attempting to
discuss what oughf to be the law.
"A Constructive Patent Law," 16 N. Y. UNiv. L. Q. REv. 179 (1939).
The desirability of such a limitation has been discussed by many writers, including Rice, "A Constructive Patent Law," 16 N. Y. UNIV. L. Q. REv. 179 (1939);
Schechter, "Would Compulsory Licensing of Patents be Unconstitutional?" 22 VA. L.
REV:, 287 (1936); Billman, "The Proposed Compulsory Working of Patents," 21
CASE AND CoMMENT 276 (1914). Considerable testimony concerning possible "suppression" of useful inventions can be found in the report of HEARINGS BEFORE THE
TEMPORARY NATIONAL EcoNoMIC COMMITTEE, pt. 3, Jan. 1939, published by the
Government Printing Office (and in BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, VERBATIM
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OFT. N. E. C.).
4

5
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Perhaps it should be made clear at the outset that this discussion
is not intended to cover the type of situation wherein a condition which
might be held valid of and by itself is declared invalid, not because of
its own nature, but because it is part and parcel of a scheme which as a
whole violates the antitrust laws. Here the particular condition falls
because the larger structure of which it is a part falls. Thus the district
judge said, in one recent decision:
"It occurs to me that if the issuance of restrictive licenses by
patentees on the use of machinery used in an industry wherein the
patentees are important units, is part of a common scheme or
cooperative effort upon the part of these units to obtain dominance
of and unreasonably restrain trade in an industry engaged in producing an unpatented article, then certainly a court of equity has
the power to declare such restrictions illegal in an action based on
the anti-trust laws." 5
&

Obviously the validity of such incidental conditions necessarily involves
consideration of the whole field of monopolistic combination and cannot be considered in this more narrowly purposed discussion. What follows relates only to the probably validity, or invalidity, of particular
conditions in and of themselves.
That the patentee could attach such conditions and limitations as
he might choose, leaving it to the licensee to decide whether he would
enter the monopoly under those restrictions or not at all, seems to have
been the original judicial attitude. In the Paper Bag case the Court
said, "patents are property, and entitled to the same rights and sanctions as other property." 6 In Rubber Tire Wheel Company v. Milwaukee Rubber Wheel Company,7 the circuit court of appeals was even
more explicit, saying,
". . . Congress put no limitations, excepting time, upon the
monopoly. Courts can create none without legislating. . . . Use
of the invention cannot be had except on the inventor's terms.
Without paying or doing whatever he exacts, no one can be exempted from his right to exclude. Whatever the terms, courts
will enforce them, provided only that the licensee is not thereby
required to violate some law outside of the patent law, like the
doing of murder or arson." 8
5 • United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., (D. C. Ohio, 1942) 46 F. Supp.
541 at 614.
6 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 28 S. Ct.
748 (1908) (syllabus).
·
7 (C.C.A. 7th, (1907) 154 F. 358 at 362.
8 This case was cited as a basis for the decision in United States v. Wayne Pump
Co.~ (D. C. Ill. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 949.
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Unhappily for the patentee-whether otherwise wisely or notcourts have begun to legislate in this :field. They now refuse to enforce
certain conditions which the patentee attac~es to his permission to use.
Some, they refuse to enforce on the ground that the condition does
-«violate some law outside of the patent law," namely, the Congressional statutes prohibiting attempts to create a monopoly. But others
they hold invalid simply on the ground that they conflict with the
courts' more recently evolved ideas of sound public policy.s•
LIMITATIONS ON EXTENT OF INVASION

In so far as one can make a distinction between limitations upon the
extent to which a licensee is authorized to invade the monopoly, and
conditions with which invasion to ariy extent must comply, it seems safe
to say that the former have not yet been judicially condemned. A
patentee still need not open his monopoly at all, and if he does open it
he can still effectively restrict the nilll}ber or character of persons who
may come in, and can limit the extent to which the invasion is permitted.
Thus, in American Equipment Company v. Tuthill Building Material Company,9 the court, for the purpose of stating "those propositions over which there can be no dispute" laid down the following
postulates: the patentee
" ... may exclude the entire population of the United States from
making, selling, or using the article covered by the patent. . .. The
right to exclude all carries with it the lesser right to exclude a part
of said population, and to permit another or others to make, sell,
or use the patent for a limited period or in a limited territory.
"Appellant's right to license one, or as many as it chooses, to
make, sell, or use the patented machine in the Chicago area was
clear. It could prefer large manufacturers or small producers .•..
In short, the patentee may exclude all. .. and this carries with it
the right to exclude some and license others .... He may require
minimum royalty payments. He may limit the number or amount
of patented articles which the licensee ~ay make."

An even more specific decision is that of Vulcan Manufacturing
Company v. M(J-ytag Company. 10 Here the patent was for a gears• A sharp distinction is intended in this discussion between the conditions and
limitations which a single patentee attaches to the licenses he gives, and those_ combinations of several patentees which allegedly violate the antitrust laws because of the
combination itself; only the first problem is considered herein.
9 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934) 69 F. (2d) 406 at 408.
10

(C. C. A. 8th, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 136.
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driven wringer to be used on power washing machines. The patentee's
license to the defendant permitted the defendant company to use the
wringer only upon washing machines of a specified type, such as the
defendant was then making. It carried no condition that the defendant
must buy from the plaintiff, but left the whole matter immaterial as to
whether the defendant should himself make the washing m·achines of
that particular type, or might get them from anybody it chose. The
limitation merely provided that if the defendant did use the wringer,
it must attach it to a certain type of washing machine, regardless of
where the machine came from. The defendant ultimately shifted its
product and began making washing machines of a different and allegedly better type. They continued to attach the patented wringer to this
·new type of washing machine. The patentee brought action to enjoin
on the ground that such use constituted a use of the patented invention
not permitted by the license.
·
The defense contended that the _plaintiff was trying to control the·
type of washing machine which coula be manufactured and sold by the
defendant, and thus was imposing an illegal condition upon the privilege of using the invented wringer. The court held, however, that
there was no condition imposed, legal .or illegal; that the limitation
was a limitation of the extent to which the defendant was permitted to
invade the plaintiff's patent monopoly; that it was permitted to invade
the monopoly to the extent of using the wringer on one type of machine, and one type only. It held this a valid limitation, and granted
the injunction.
So, too, in Good Humor Corporation 'V. Popsicle Corporation 11 the
court upheld as valid a limitation on the extent to which the licensee
might intrude. The patent was for a process of freezing ice cream,
sherbet, water ice, and· other liquids onto a stick from which they might
in due course be eaten. The license purported to grant the defendant
the right to use the patented process for making such frozen suckers
out of sherbet or water ice, but not to use it for making suckers out of
milk, or ice cream. The court held that this limitation of the right of
intrusion was valid and ~nforceable.12
(D. C. Del. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 344.
Radio Craft Co. v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1925)
7 F. (2d) 432, upheld a limitation to the effect that while the licensee might make
embodiments of the invention, he might sell them only to certain classes of buyers-amateurs, experimenters, scientific schools, etc. So also Westinghouse Electric & Mfg.
Co. v. Tri-City Radio Electric Supply Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) 23 F. (2d) 628,
licensee held not privileged to sell through middlemen. The Sherman Act specifically
11

12
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So long as the limitation can fairly be characterized as a restriction
upon the extent to which the licensee is permitted to invade the monopoly created by the patent, whether the limitation be one of geography, or of market, or of purpose, or of extent of use, there appear
to be no decisions denying the patentee's right to impose it.13
But conditions to which the licensee must conform his conduct, by
way of consideration for permission to invade the monopoly, have not
so consistently found tolerance in the courts.14 On the contrary, both
conditions as to the price at which the licensee can dispose of certain
articles and conditions as to his manner of use of the patented invention
have met with reprobation.
CONDITIONS CONCERNING RESALE PRICE

It is trite learning that conditions fixing the minimum price at
which a licensee might resell the patented article, or limiting the prices
at which he might sell the unpatented product of a patented machine or
process, were originally held by "the courts to be valid and enforceable.15 The reasons for the later judicial denial of the validity of these
conditions were not made particularly clear by the courts.
An attempted limitation on sales price may arise out of four quite
di:fferent situations. First, the sales may be by agents of the patentee,
allows selection of customers in bona fide transactions· not in restraint of trade. Federal
Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 42 S. Ct. 150 (1922);
Johnson v. J. H. Yost Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1941) II7 F. (2d) 53 (dictum).
13 American Equipment Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Materials Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1934)
69 F. (2d) 406, does in effect invalidate a limitation on the extent of use. The.contract
provision in fact amounted to limitation on the number of bricks that the licensee might
make witli the patented machine. In form it was a restriction on the price at which the
product would be sold, and it was in terms of price restriction that the court condemned it.
14 It must be conceded thar this verbal distinction between limitations and conditions is not absolutely sharp, nor is it assumed to be so. One man is permitted to invade
the monopoly to the extent of using the patented wringer on a certain type of washtub
only. Another is licensed to invade on condition that he use the patented wringer only
on nonpatented washtubs purchased from the licensor. There is a difference in the
validity of the two restrictions. Is one a limitation on extent of invasion and the other
a collateral condition? The writer has no wish to raise an argument; the terms are used
not as a matter of epitherical jurisprudence, not with any suggestion that by calling the
restriction by one name or the other its validity can be determined, but only as a verbal
convenience in generalization.
15 Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 22 S. Ct. 747 (1902); Elliman, Sons & Co. v. Carrington & Son, [1901] 2 Ch. Div. 275, wherein the court
refused even to hear argument against validity; Garst v. Charles, 187 Mass. 144, 72
N. E. 839 (1905); Commonwealth v. Grinstead, III Ky. 203, 63 S. W. 427 (1901);
Waite, "Public Policy and Personal Opinion," 19 M1cH. L. REv. 265 at 270
(1921).
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acting for him and with authority to sell only at fixed prices. Second,
the patentee may authorize a licensee to make embodiments of the
invention himself, but on condition that the licensee shall not dispose
of them below a fixed price. Third, the patentee may authorize a
licensee to use a patented process or to use a patented machine on condition that he shall not sell the unpatented product thereof below a
certain price. Fourth, the patentee may sell an embodiment of his invention to another under an agreement concerning the price at which
that other may resell it.

Price Restrictions upon Agents
The first of these possibilities is fairly exemplified in United States
v. General Electric Company. 16 Here the General Electric Company
itself manufactured lamps covered by a patent which it owned. Some
of these lamps it sold directly to large buyers through its own salaried
employees. To small consumers it sold through some 21,000 retail
electric appliance stores. The agreement with these stores fixed the
price at which the lamps might be sold. The government attacked these
agreements as monopolistic. The Supreme Court first examined the
contracts with these retail stores, and, after some difficulty, set up the
premise that the stores were not themselves purchasers from the manufacturer, and hence were not owners of the lamps, but were truly mere
agents of the manufacturer. The Court then had no d~:fficulty in holding that the contracts, wherein the price at which the agents might sell
for the principal was set, were perfectly valid. Said the Court,
". . . The owner of an article, patented or otherwise, is not
violating the common law, or the Anti-Trust law, by seeking to
dispose of his article directly to the consumer and fixing the price
by which his agents transfer the title from him directly to such
consumer." 17

Price Restrictions upon Patented Articles made by Licensee
The second situation mentioned above, wherein a patentee authorizes a licensee to make embodiments of the invention on condition that
he sell them only at a certain price, was also considered in the General
Electric Company case. The company had authorized the Westing272 U.S. 476, 47 S. Ct. 192 (1926).
Id., 272 U. S. at 488. This case is cited as authority for a similar statement, as
dictum, in American Equipment Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Materials Co., (C. C. A. 7th,
1934) 69 F. (2d) 406.
16

17
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house Company to manufacture light bulbs covered by the patent, on
condition that the Westinghouse Company should sell only at prices
fixed by the patentee. The Court considered squarely the question
whether this condition was valid, and held it to be so.
" ..• The patentee," said the Court, "may make and grant a
license to another to make and use the patented articles, but withhold his right to sell them. The licensee in such a case acquires an
interest in the articles made. He owns the material of them and
may use them. But if he sells them, he infringes the right of the
patentee, and may be held for damages and enjoined. If the patentee goes further, and licenses the selling of the arti_cles, may he
limit the selling by limiting the method of sale and the price? We
think he may do so, provided the conditions of sale are normally
and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's monopoly. One of the valuable elements of the exclusive
right of a patentee is to acquire profit by the price at which the article is sold. The higher the price, the greater the profit, unless
it is prohibitory. When the patentee licenses another to make and
vend, and retains the right to continue to make and vend on his
own account, the price at which his licensee will sell will ,necessarily affect the price at which he can sell his own patented goods. It
would seem entirely reasonable that he should say to the licensee,
'Yes, you may make and sell articles under my patent, but not so
as to destroy the profit that I wish to obtain by making them and
selling them myself.' He does not thereby sell outright to the
licensee the articles the latter may make and sell, or vest absolute
ownership in them.18 He restricts the property and interest the
licensee has in the goods he makes and proposes to sell." 19

Price Restrictions upon Unpatented Products of
Patented Machine
This decision in its turn suggests the third situation referred to
above, where a patentee authorizes a licensee to use a patented process
or to use a, patented machine on collateral condition that he will not
sell the product thereof below a stated price. In the General Electric
18 But does he not? Cf. American Bell Telephone Co. v. Kitsell, (C. C. N. Y.
1888) 35 F. 521.
19 United States v. General Electric,Co., 272 U.S. 476 at 490, 47 S. Ct. 192
(1926). This decision was followed by the district court in Unitec;l States v. Wayne
Pump Co., (D. C. Ill. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 949, holding that a patentee may lawfully
fix the price at which his licensee sells ~mbodiments made by the licensee. Whether or
not a certain implied "hunching" in respect to this rule was intended by the court in
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 62 S. Ct. 1088 (1942), is an interesting speculation.
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case the Westinghouse Company was not using a patented process or
machine; it was making lamps which themselves were covered by the
patent. The sale or use of the lamps would itself be an invasion of the
patent monopoly. In the situation now to be considered, the lamp or
other device which is to be sold is not covered by any patent; its sale
and use are free to the world. The condition as to price is not attached
to the sale of the lamps, over which the patentee could have no control,
but to the use of the process or machine for making them. But despite
the difference in fact situations, the reasons given in the General Electric case for upholding the patentee's right to fix the price at which the
maker of the patented article may sell it should apply with equal force
in supporting his right to fix the price at which the user of a patented
machine or process may sell its product. Everything the Court said in
the General Electric case concerning the need of the patentee to protect
his own selling price from cutthroat competition by his licensees is as
applicable when the licensee is a user of the patented process as when
he is a manufacturer of the patented devices. The Court's statement
might reasonably be paraphrased into a recognition that a patentee who
uses his patented machine or process to produce articles for the market
will be affected in his profits by the price at which others whom he
permits to use that machine or process sell their products; therefore it
is important to him to control the price at which any such products are
sold. As an analogy, United States v. General Electric Company seems
clearly to support the validity of a condition as to the price at which the
licensee of a patented machine or process may sell the product. The
issue seems not to have been precisely decided by the courts, however,
and dicta in other decisions throw some doubt upon the likelihood of
the General Electric analogy being followed.
The matter was touched on, but not quite precisely, in American
Equipment Company v. Tuthill Building Material Company.20 Here
the equipment company had licensed the defendant to use a patented
brick-carrying machine in connection with brickmaking. The royalty
for such use was fixed at $.30 per thousand bricks, if no more than a
certain number of bricks were made. The agreement provided that the
royalty should be increased from this $.30 up to from $r.8o to $3.00
per thousand, according to the amount by which this limited number
was exceeded. This increased royalty was so great as to be in effect
prohibitive of any excess in the number of bricks made. Obviously,
therefore, the royalty to be paid was really a limitation by the patentee
20

(C. C. A. 7th, 1934) 69 F. (2d) 406.
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upon the number of bricks which might be made by means of the patented machine, rather than a limitation on the price at which bricks so
made might be sold. The limitation was held to be void and unenforceable. In the course of its decision, however, the court said: "The
owner of a patent which covers a process or a machine for making an
unpatented article . . . may not fix the price at which the article shall
be sold." 21 The court gave no reason for this statement, but relied
merely upon the precedent of Motion Pictures Patents Company v.
Universal Film Company,2 2 which itself was not a price-fixing case,
but involved an entirely different type of limitation-one obligating
the patentee to use the patented machine only with supplies purchased
from the patentee.
This American Equipment Company case is the most precise judicial declaration concerning tlie validity of limitations upon the sale
price of products of a patented machine or process. The statement itself
that such a limitation would be invalid is unexplained, is predicated
upon a precedent which has nothing to do with it, and is thus no more
than dictum. On the other side is the analogy of the General Electric
Company case in support of the validity of such a condition. Hence
the problem seems still to be open for litigation.
Price·Restrict~ons upon Resale of Patented Articles
The fourth possible situation out of which the validity of a price
restriction might arise is the outright sale by a patentee of an embodiment of his invention, with a limitation that the purchaser must not
sell it below a fixed price. Here there is a quite definitely settled rule
that the condition is invalid. But here the reasons for the decision vary
according as the court looks at the subpriced resale an an alleged unauthorized invasion of the patentee's monopoly, or as the breach of an
alleged agreement with the patentee. In Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell 2 3
the patentee sued on the theory that the defendant, in reselling below
the agreed price, was infringing the patent. The Supreme Court said,
"The question propounded is: 'Did the acts of the appellee, in retailing
at less than the price fixed in said notice, original packages of "Sanatogen" purchased of jobbers as aforesaid, constitute infringement of
appellants' patent?'" 24 In determining this question, the Court held
that when the patentee sold to the first buyer and passed title to him,
Id. at 409.
243 U.S. 502, 37 S. Ct. 416 (1916).
28 229 U.S. 1, 33 S. Ct. 616 (1912).
24 Id., 229 U. S. at 9.
21

22
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the chattel passed out entirely from the scope of the patent monopoly.
Hence the person who resold the chattel could not be said to have infringed upon the monopoly. This was an undeniably logical proposition in which no question of public policy was involved if the major
premise be accepted. If by the patentee's sale of the chattel he authorized its use and sale by others free of the patent monopoly, that. use
and sale could be no infringement of his patent. The major premise,
that the patentee did intentionally free the chattel from the restrictions
of the patent, the Court merely assumes without real discussion. But
that assumption will undoubtedly now be followed by other courts.
In Dr. Miles Medical Company v. Park & Sons Company,25 the
action was one to enjoin inducement of breach of contract, and therefore squarely raised the question of validity of the contract not to sell
below the stated price. No question of patent infringement was involved. The majority of the Supreme Court held the agreement to
be invalid, saying:
"The complainant's plan falls within the principle which condemns contracts of this class. It, in effect, creates a combination
for the prohibited purposes. No distinction can properly be made
by reason of the particular character of the commodity in question.
It is not entitled to special privilege or immunity. It is an article
of commerce and the rules concerning the freedom of trade must
be held to apply to it. Nor does the fact that the margin of freedom is reduced by the control of production make the protection
of what remains, in such a case, a negligible matter. And where
commodities have passed into the channels of trade and are owned
by dealers, the validity of agreements to prevent competition and
to maintain prices is not to be determined by the circumstance
whether they were produced by several manufacturers or by one,
·or whether they were previously owned by one or by many. The
complainant having sold its product at prices satisfactory to itself,
the public is entitled to whatever advantage may be derived from
competition in the subsequent traffic." 26
•
25

220 U.S. 373, 31 S. Ct. 376 (19u).
Id., 220 U. S. at 408-409. Essentially the same decision and the same type of
reasoning in support of it appear in United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241,
62 S. Ct. 108 8 ( I 942). Here the patentee sold optical lens blanks covered by the
patent on condition that the buyer-licensee should not resell them below a fixed price.
The government asked injunction against such procedure as a violation of the Sherman
Act, contending that it constituted a prohibited restraint of trade. The Court assumes,
on the authority of precedent and without fundamental inquiry, that by selling the lens
blanks the patentee had so completely authorized their use, despite the express limitation accompanying the sale, that whatever the buyer-licensee did with them could not
26
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Justice Holmes, however, in his dissenting op1mon, said most
emphatically:
" ... There is no statute covering the case; there is no body
of precedent that by ineluctable logic requires the conclusion to
which the court has come. The conclusion is reached by extending
a certain conception of public policy to a new sphere. On such matters we are in perilou~ country. I think that, at least, it is safe to
say that the most enlightened judicial policy is to let people
manage their own business in their own way, unless the ground
for interference is very clear. What then is the ground upon
which we interfere in the present case? Of course, it is not the
interest of the producer. No one, I judge, cares for that. It hardly
can be the interest of subordinate vendors, as there seems to be no
particular reason for preferring them to the originator and first
vendor of the product. Perhaps it may be assumed to be the
interest of the consumers and the public. On that point I confess
that I am in a minority as to larger issues than are concerned here.
I think that we greatly exaggerate the value and importance to
the public of competition in the production or distribution of an
article (here it is only distribution), as fixing a fair price. What
really fixes that is the competition of conflicting desires. We, none
of us, can have as much as we want of all the things that we want.
Therefore, we have to choose. As soon as the price of something
that we want goes above the point at which we are willing to give
up other things to have that, we cease to buy it and buy something
else. Of course, I am speaking of things that we can get along
without. There may be necessaries that sooner or later must be
dealt with like short rations in a shipwreck, but they are not Dr.
Miles's medicines. With regard to things like the latter it seems
be an infringement of the patentee-seller's monopoly. The logical propriety of this
assumption might be questioned, but it was the Court's assumption. Hence the only
remedy left to the patentee would be upon the buyer-licensee agreements not' to sell
below the fixed price. These agreements the Court held to be in violation of the antitrust statute.
The finding that by sale of an, embodiment the patentee intends to give up control
over its use and, hence, to authorize its use in any way, without liability for infringement of the patent monopoly, was made as early as Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany
Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U. S. 425, 14 S. Ct. 627 (1893). But in this
case, unlike the facts of the Univis case, although the pa,tentee made a practice of selling
his device only in connection with purchases of other materials, there was no express
negation.in the contract of sale of the buyer's complete right of enjoyment.
So also Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U. S. 659, at 666, 15 S. Ct.
738 (1895), where the Court said, "Whether a patentee may protect himself and his
assjgnees by special contracts brought home to the purchasers is not a question before
us, and upon which we express no opinion."
·
·
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to me that the point of most profitable returns marks the equilibrium of social desires and determines the fair price in the only
sense in which I can find meaning in those words. The Dr. Miles
Medical Company knows better than we do what will enable it to
do the best business. We must assume its retail pric_e to be reasonable, for it is so alleged and the case is here on demurrer; so I see
nothing to warrant my assuming that the public will not be served
best by the company being allowed to carry out its plan. I cannot
believe that in the long run the public will profit by this court
permitting knaves to cut reasonable prices for some ulterior purpose of their own and thus to impair, if not to destroy, the production and sale of articles which it is assumed to be desirable that
the public should be able to get." 21
So far as any real doctrine of public policy is concerned, Justice
Holmes's opinion appears to be the sounder. Moreover the opinion of
the majority was rejected by some state courts.28 It was founded upon
no real consideration whatsoever of public policy. 29 Since that decision
the legislatures of two-thirds of the states have completely repudiated
its ideas of sound public policy as to resale price maintenance; statutes
commonly called the "fair-trade" acts have been widely adopted.80
These state statutes which explicitly authorize the making of resale
price maintenance contracts have been held valid by the United States
27 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 at 411-412, 3 I S. Ct.
376 (19II).
28 Ingersoll & Bro. v. Hahne & Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 222, IOI A. 1030 (1917), 89
N. J. Eq. 332, 108 A. 128 (1918), in which the opinion said (88 N. J. Eq. at 226):
"I am now considering the public policy of the State of New Jersey as distinguished
from any public policy of the United States.... after careful consideration, I have come
to the conclusion that upon the general proposition, I agree with the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Holmes...." Grogan v. Chafee, I 56 Cal. 6II, 105 P. 745 (1909);
Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker, 164 Cal. 355, 128 P•. 1041 (1912); Fisher Flouring
Mills Co. v. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649, 137 P. 144 (1914); Rawleigh Medical Co. v.
Osborne, 177 Iowa 208, 158 N. W. 566 (1916); Quinlivan v. Brown Oil Co., 96
Mont. 147, 29 P. (2d) 374 (1934).
The Court's ideas of public policy were contrary also to those of many commentators. Rogers, "Predatory Price Cutting as Unfair Trade," 27 HARv. L. REv.
139 (1913); McLaughlin, "Fair Trade Acts," 86 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 803 (1938).
It is particularly odd that the Supreme Court should have thus itself imposed a
limitation upon individual freedom of contract, in view of the hesitancy which courts
have shown in permitting ,legislatures to impose limitations. Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277 (1907); Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N. E.
62 (1894); State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co., 33 W. Va. 188, IO S. E. 288
(1889).
29 See Symposium, 4 LAw & CoNTEM. PROB. 271ff (1937).
so See McAllister, "Price Control by Law in the United States: A Survey," 4 LAw
& CoNTEM. PROB. 273 at 296 (1937); 45 YALE L. J. 672 (1936).
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Supreme Court despite its own previously expr~sed opinion of the
economic unwisdom of such contracts.st Even the Sherman Act has now
been amended to read as follows:
" . . . Provided that nothing conj:ained herein shall render
illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for
the resale of commodity which bears ... the trade mark, brand,
or name of the producer ... when contracts or agreements of that
description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions, under
any statute, law or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any
State...." 32

a

In view of these more recent developments, it would seem that
even this type of price-maintenance contract might now be generally
.sustained. If this is so, the ultimate conclusion must be that the whole
range of price-;-maintenance conditions once accepted as valid, then suddenly suspect as invalid, have now again been clothed with respectability and can be enforced either by way of action for infringement of
the patent-monopoly, because the condition on which infringement was
permitted has been broken, or by way of procedure upon the contract
itself. That, however, remains to be seen.38
CONDITIONS CoNCERNING THE UsE

OF

NoNPATENTED MATERIAL

A different type of condition in license agreements sets up a requirement that the licensee confine his enjoyment of the patent to its
use with certain unpatented materials. Here we find an e~phatic judicial repudiation of the validity of all such conditions; a judicial attitude
which, unlike the condemnation of resale price restrictions, has not yet
met with serious contradiction by other agencies. But here again the
reasons for denying validity to those contracts have been neither con31 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 57
S. Ct. 13(} (1936); Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales Corp., 299 U. S. 198, 57 S. Ct. 147
.(1936).
82 50 Stat. L. 693 (1937); amending 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C.
(1940), § I.
38 Since the invalidity of these resale price contracts was predicated solely upon
the Court's belief that they were in conflict with sound public policy, it is pertinent to
note the Supreme Court's own realization of the possible impermanence of its beliefs as
to public policy. "The truth is that the theory of public policy embodies a doctrine of
vague and variable quality, and unless deducible in the given circumstances from constitutional or statutory provisions, should be accepted as the basis of a judicial determination, if at all, only with the utmost circumspection. The public policy of one generation
may not, under changed conditions, be the public policy of another." Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, at 306, 50 S. Ct. 253 (1929). See also the suggestion hereinafter
that courts have in fact discarded their own once relied upon ideas of wise policy.
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sistent nor clear. Sometimes the decision is put upon the ground that
the attempted condition is a violation of statute, such as the Clayton
Act; sometimes on the ground that it conflicts with "public policy";
sometimes no reason is stated.
In Carbice Corporation of America v. American Patents Development Corporation 8 " the plaintiff's patent was a container for the use of
dry ice ( solid carbon dioxide). He permitted the use of his patented
containers on condition that they should be used only with dry ice furnished by himself. In due course he began an action to enjoin the defendant from further contributory infringement by furnishing dry ice
to users of the containers. The Supreme Court held that the condition
was invalid, and that there was no contributory infringement. Just why
the condition was invalid, the Court does not say. It does not even put
the invalidity on "public policy"; much less does it pretend to investigate the public policy wisdom of the limitation. Neither does it put the
invalidity upon the ground of statute, such as the Clayton Act. Instead,
it simply confines itself to declaring the limitation to be invalid because
of the precedent of Motion Picture Patents Company v. Universal
Film Manufacturing Company,85 and of the various price-fixing cases
already discussed.
Obviously it does not necessarily follow that because a condition
concerning resale prices is contrary to public policy, a condition as to
use of certain materials is also contrary to public policy. Moreover, as
just pointed out, the resale price decisions have now lost much of the
force of their authority. The Court's other justification for its decision
-reliance upon the Motion Picture Patents case-is also highly questionable. In the Motion Picture Patents case the Court had said, it is·
true, that the patent law does not extend the monopoly of the patentee
to materials and things outside the invention. "Whatever right the·
283 U.S. 27, 51 S. Ct. 334 (1931).
It must be recognized that the presently prevailing notion of the Department
of Justice, as evidenced by Mr. Thurman Arnold, appears to be that any and every
condition attached to a license privilege is suspect and presumably contrary to public
policy. Moreover, the Temporary National Economic Committee, to which that notion
was expounded, approved a blanket recommendation that a patentee "be not permitted
to impose restrictions upon the buyer in sales of patented articles. In other words, the
holder of a patent should not be permitted to restrict a licensee in respect of the amount
of any article he may produce, the price at which he may sell, the purpose for which or
the manner in which he may use the patent or any article produced thereunder, or the
geographical area within which he may produce or sell such article." T. N. E. C.,
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 36-37 (1941) (S. Doc. 35, 77th Cong. ISt
sess.).
35 243 U.S. 502, 37 S. Ct. 416 (1916).
84
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owner may have to control by restriction the materials to be used in
operating the machine must be derived through the general law from
the ownership of the property in the machine. . . ." 36 Hence, that
case held, an action for infringement would not lie because the defendant, being owner by consent of the' patentee of the machine involved,
was entitled to use it in any way he chose, regardless of the monopoly,
and the plaintiff had not even alleged a patent monopoly of the other
materials. But in the Carbice case, though the action was in form for
contributory infringement, the Court held the condition itself to be invalid, relying on the Motion Picture decision. As to. the validity of the
contract between the parties, that latter Court had explicitly said,
"The extent to which the use of the patented machine may
validly be restricted to specific supplies or otherwise by specific
contract between the owner of a patent and the purchaser or
licensee is a questiQn outside the patent law, and with it we are not
here concerned." 87
The Motion Picture Patents case, therefore, on which the Carbice decision relies for its holding that. the contract limitation on use of the
containers was invalid, obviously does not support the Carbice conclusion. But the decision itself remains, of course, regardless of how it
is justified.88
A number of other decisions have put the invalidity of contracts
requiring the licensee to use only with specified unpatented material
upon their inconsistency with the Clayton Act. In Standard Fashion
Company v. Magrane-Houston Company,3° the plaintiff had agreed to
sell paper patterns to the defendant retailer at reduced price, on con- ·
dition that the defendant would not handle similar goods of any other
manufacturer. This c~ntract was held unenforceable,_ because it tended
substantially to lessen competition and fell within section 3 of the
Clayton Act, which made it "unlawful ... to lease or make a sale or
Id., 243 U. S. at 513.
Id., 243 U. S. at 509.
88 Boston Stor~ of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 38 S. Ct.
257 (1917), was an action to enjoin breach of contract which attempted to fix the
resale price of patented graphophone records; held, the price-fixing was "contrary to
general law and void." The Carbice case did at least cite this decision. This decision in
its turn was rested partly on Bauer·& Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 376
(19II), which made little attempt to get into the public policy question.
Again in Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 288 (1937),
the Court held a similar condition invalid and again it gave no reason for so holding
except that it was so ·held in the Carbice case.
39 25~ U.S. 346, 42 S. Ct. 360 (1922).
36
37
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contract for sale of goods . . . on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser shall not use or deal in the goods
• . . of a competitor . . . where the effect • . . may be to substantially
lessen competition...." 40 This case, to be sure, did not involve the
question of the patent law, but the Clayton Act itself specifically applies to such contracts "for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented."41
In International Business Machines Corporation v. United States-tz
the International Corporation leased patented machines for the mechanical or electrical tabulation of variously punched cards. It was a
condition of the lease that the lessee must use in the machine only
cards made by the lessor. The lessor alleged that exact thickness of
card and freedom from grease smuts was essential to satisfactory operation of the machines; that the purpose of the condition was not to limit
competition, but to assure satisfactory operation of the machines, and
thereby to protect the lessor's good will. In an action by the government to enjoin the making of such· leases, and to declare void those
which had been made, it was held that the leases were void under
40 38 Stat. L. 731 (1914), 15 U.S. C. (1940), § 14.
n On the effect of the Clayton Act in general, see also Carter Carburetor Corp.
v. Federal Trade Commission, (C. C. A. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 722. Action of the company in making prices to distributors depend on whether or not the latter carried
products of a competitor was held properly subject to a cease and desist order by the
commission, because of violation of Clayton Act.
American Lecithin Co. v. War.field Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 207.
Patent on process for mixing lecithin with chocolate to prevent greying. Action, for injunction against infringement of the process by defendant. Held no infringement because patentee's condition that users of the process must buy lecithin from him was an
"extra-legal monopolization." Cert. denied, 308 U.S. 609, 60 S. Ct. 175 (1940). See
note 38 M1cH. L. REv. 1119 (1940).
American Equipment Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., (8. C. A. 7th, 1934)
69 F. (2d) 406. A license to use a patented brick-handling machine, the royalty to
increase markedly if more than a certain number of bricks were handled. Held, the
limitation as to the number of bricks which the licensee might handle "was not a license
provision, but was a price fixing, quantity production limitation, the inevitable result of
which was the unreasonable restraint of commerce and the creation of a monopoly •••
the dominant thought, purpose, and plan were to control brick production and brick
prices ..•• The entire contract is therefore void." Id. at 409.
United States v. Wayne Pump Co., (D. C. Ill. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 949 at 956:
''While ownership of the patent gives to the patentee a complete monopoly within the
field of his patent, it of course does not give him any license to violate the provision
of the Sherman Act or of any other law." (Dictum.)
42 298 U.S. 131, 56 S. Ct. 701 (1935). But compare the decisions cited in notes
50 and 5 I, infra.
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section 3 of the Clayton Act, because of their tendency to create a
monopoly in respect of the unpatented cards.
Agreements Not Tending to Create a Monopoly
It should be noted, however, that the Clayton Act in terms makes
such licensing agreements void only if the effect thereof "may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce." Obviously, licensing agreements which do not th-qs
tend to create monopolies or adversely affect competition do not so fall
within the act. If this latter type of condition is to be held invalid, it
m_ust be so on the ground that it is contrary to public policy.
But if the condition does not tend to lessen competition or to create
a monopoly, would it be contrary to public policy?
What is or is not contrary to public policy is obviously a matter of
opinion, and not a rule of law. In Muller v. Oregon,48 where the public
policy of a statute limiting the hours of employment for women was
in question, Mr. Brandeis filed with the Supreme Court a two-volume
brief demonstrating the adverse effect upon women, and through them
upon society, of long-continued hours of work. This was a logical and
sensible procedure. In another case,44 after Mr. Brandeis became Justice Brandeis, h~ remarked that in order to determine the public policy
of a law limiting certain aspects of baking activities, it was really necessary for the Court to inform itself definitely of the problems confronting those engaged in the business of baking. "Knowledge is
essential to understanding; and understanding should precede judging."
But as a general rule the facts upon which the public policy must
depend in any given -issue are seldom before the court. A judge's
decision as to what is or is not public policy is not a matter of logical
deduction from a mass of facts presented in evidence, but his own
personal reaction from such information as he may have acquired in
one uncertain way or another. Not infrequently, questions of public
policy are determined not through the court's knowledge of facts, but
because of the enthusiasm and emphasis with which some attorney
asserts the conflict with public policy. Once a court has determined that
something is not in accord with public policy, other courts find it far
easier to adopt that opinion than to hunt out facts and to formulate an
opinion for themselves. It may be, therefore, that they will continu_e
43
44

208 U.S. 412, 28 S. Ct. 324 (1907).
Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 at 520, 44 S. Ct. 412 (1923).
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to declare invalid, as contrary to public policy, agreements which require a licensee as a condition of his permitted use to buy materials of
the licensor, even though such agreements do not in fact "substantially" lessen competition, nor "tend to create a monopoly."
On the other hand, judicial opinions of what is or is not wise
public policy are not wholly invulnerable to argument nor incapable
.of change. The apparent change of opinion in respect to the wisdom
of resale price agreements has already been suggested. In People v.
Charles Schweinler Press 45 the New York Court of Appeals quite
frankly departed from a previous opinion as to wise public policy on the
ground that since the time of its previous opinion it had acquired additional knowledge of facts. It is not impossible, therefore, that in respect
of conditions requiring purchase of supplies, which conditions do not
actually violate some statute, one court or another 46 might be induced,
by proper presentation of facts, to depart from the decision in the
Carbice case.47

¥ ARIOUS

OTHER CONDITIONS

Many conditions have been attached to licenses which cannot be
classed either as restrictions upon use of nonpatented materials, or as
directly affecting the sale price of goods; neither are they what this
writer would call limitations upon the permitted extent of invasion of
45

214 N. Y. 395, rn8 N. E. 639 (1915).
Of course, if the suit is on the contract, rather than for infringement, it need
not be brought in the federal courts.
47 There are various indications in the cases, however, militating against any such
hope. Thus, in G. S. Suppiger Co. v. Morton Sale Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) II7 F.
(2d) 968, the plaintiff had licensed others to use his invention on condition that they
should buy unpatented salt from him. The trial court held the condition to be invalid.
The circuit court of appeals criticized this finding on the ground that the condition
would not be invalid unless it was affirmatively shown so substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly as to run counter to the Clayton Act. The mere fact
that it was a limitation on the licensee's freedom in buying salt from whomever he
wished, the court obviously felt did not invalidate it as a matter of public policy, if the
statute itself were not violated. But the Supreme Court in its turn, Morton Salt Co. v.
G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 62 S. Ct. 402 (1942), held the condition to be
invalid, without attempting to decide whether or not it was a violation of the Clayton
Act. As the Court put it: "The public policy which includes inventions within the
granted monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the invention. It equally
forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not
granted by the Patent Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant." 314
U. S. at 492. See note in 40 MrcH. L. REv. 1266 (1942).
In other decisions it is obvious that the court gave no weight whatever to the
"substantiality'' of the effect of the condition on competition, apparently believing that
the mere existence of the condition and of the attempt thereby to lessen competition in
any degree brought it within the condemnation of public policy and made it invalid.
46
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the monopoly-limitations whose validity, as already explained, appears not to have been effectively disputed. In general these other
miscellaneous conditions have been held not to be contrary to public
policy, hence to be valid and enforceable. In Steiner Sales Company
v ..Schwartz Sales Company,4 8 an agreement by a licensee not to contest
the validity of the patent during the term of the license was held valid,
chiefly on the ground that it merely expressed a limitation which the
law itself imposes on him. Whether or not an express agreement not to
contest the validity of the patent after termination of a license would
be valid was explicitly left undetermined. The court did suggest that
a contract not to contest the scope of the patent or not to set up any
defense in response to a suit for infringement might possibly be invalid,
but did not determine the matter. 49 More particularly-in point, the
court held valid a requirement that the licensee must buy patented
improvements for use with the patented article itself from the patentee. 50
E.G. Philad Co. v. Lechler Laboratories, (C: C. A. 2d, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 747. In
this case it was held also that the condition was invalid even though it affected only
special types of materials.
In Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co.; 3-02 U.S. 458, at 463, 58 S. Ct. 288 (1937),
the Co11rt said flatly, "every use of a patent as a means of obtaining-a limited monopoly
of unpatented material is prohibited•... It [this rule] applies whatever the nature of
the device by which the owner of the patent seeks to effect such unauthorized extention of the monopoly." That the Codrt which made this declaration of what public
policy requires would change its opinion· as the result of further education in economic
conditions and needs may be hoped, but scarcely expected.
·
Walton Hamilton, the writer of the report to the TEMPORARY NATIONAL EcoNOMIC CoMMITl'EE, MoNOGRAPH No. 31, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE 62 ff
(1941), makes a vigorous and persuasive assertion that such conditions as are here under
consideration are contrary to public policy-without however offering any evidence in
support of the assertion. By contrast he deprecates and depreciates the "high considerations of public policy involved in the recognition of a wide liberty in the making of
contracts."
48 , (C. C. A. 10th, 1936) 98 F. (2d) 999.
49 Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 12 S. Ct. 632 (1891), held contrary to public policy an agreement not to contest validity of licensor's other patents;
United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Caunt, (D. C. Mass. 1904) 134 F. 239, held valid
for the whole term of the patent a contract not to contest; Eskimo Pie Corp. v.
National Ice Cream Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1928) _26 F. (2d) 901, held (syllabus):
"One accepting license under patent may lawfully agree not to contest the patent, not
only during term, but even after the license has terminated; but _agreement, to have
that effect, must be in such express and clear words that intent is cle.ir."
50 A requirement that the lessee buy all repair parts from the lessor was held valid
in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., (D. C. Mo. 1920) 264 F. 138,
affirmed on other ground United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States, 258 U. S.
451, 42 S. Ct. 363 (1921), but an obligation to buy other supplies fro~ the lessor was
held not valid. It is difficult to reconcile the decision in International Business
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So, too, in Pick Manufacturing Company v. General Motors Corporation,51 it appeared that the Chevrolet Motor Car Company had
made contracts with its distributors and dealers binding them not to
"sell, offer for sale, or use in the repair of Chevrolet motor vehicles
and chassis, second-hand or used parts or any part or parts not manufactured by or authorized by the Chevrolet Motor Company." In an
action by a competing manufacturer of such parts to have these contracts set aside as violative of the Clayton Act, the Chevrolet Company
alleged that the condition was necessary in order to protect the company in its guarantee of cars for ninety days or 4,000 miles. The court
held that even beyond the terms of this warranty, the limitation -was
valid as being the proper protection of the reputation of the company.
This decision is somewhat difficult to reconcile with_ that of Lord v.
Radio Corporation of America,"2 wherein the licensee was authorized
to manufacture patented radio receiving sets on condition that he
should buy the "vacuum tubes to be used as parts of the circuits
licensed hereunder and required to make initially operative the apparatus licensed under this agreement" from the licensor. The court
held this restriction to be invalid. under the Clayton Act, because it
substantially lessened competition in the manufacturing and furnishing
of such tubes. 53 Nor is it easily reconciled with the International Machines Corporation case.5 " Possibly, however, these decisions simply
emphasize the proposition that if the questioned condition does not
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, its validity depends solely upon whether or not it is contrary to publi~ policy.55
Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U. S. 131, 56 S. Ct. 701 (1935), supra note
42, with these holdings.
51 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 641, affirmed 299 U. S. 3, 57 S. Ct. 1
(1936).
52 (D. C. Del. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 962.
58 The case was affirmed Radio Corporation of America v. De Forest Radio Co.,
(C. C. A. 3d, 1930) 47 F. (2d) 606.
H International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U. S. 131, 56
S. Ct. 701 (1935), discussed supra at note 42.
55 Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Diamond State Fibre Co., (D. C. Del.
1920) 268 F. 121. The patent was for a gear made of laminated fibrous material held
together by a phenolithic adhesive. The plaintiff licensed 80 persons to manufacture
such gears, but required that they be made only out of blanks furnished by plaintiff.
The defendant was enjoined from inducing a licensee to break this contract by buying
material from defendants. Held, the condition was a valid restriction on the licensee's
right to make, because there was no obligation not to deal in gears of competitor, hence
there was no monopoly in gears, and there was nt> obligation not to buy material for
otker purpo1e1 from others. The court seems to be reconciling its decision witli the
"invalid extension of monopoly" decisions by considering the laminated blanks which
the licensee was obligated to buy from the licensor as parts of the patented device.
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CONCLUSIONS AS TO VALIDITY

All these decisions, whether the condition involved concerns price,
use, or something else, rather cogently force one to the conclusion that
inasmuch as a patentee need not open his monopoly to o~hers at all,
any limitation or condition which he chooses to impose upon those to
whom he does open it is valid, unless it either runs counter to some
statute such as the Clayton Act, or is inconsistent with what a particular
court believes to be proper public policy. Yet most courts, today, would
be more than willing to concede that "public policy" is not the product
of some transcendental reality voicing itself accurately through a
mechanistic judge. On the contrary, it is nothing more than the expression of judicial notions of what ought to be, evolved partly from
the opinions of prior judgment and largely from personal reaction to
a more or less empirically developed assumption of facts. These judicial reactions, therefore, are presumably subject to instruction and
argument.
When the problem .of patent law before a court is that indeterminable matter of the presence or absence of "inventive genius" it is
well recognized that the successful attorney must be a combination of
imaginative detective and persuasive proponent. So too, it seems safe
to say, determination of the issue of validity of a condition in the license
contract will depend, in the. absence of specific statute, upon education of
the court in respect of the actual fact situation and the persuasiveness
of attorneys as to the proper conclusions of policy to be drawn therefrom.
It must be admitted, however, that the attorney who hopes to
broaden the scope of the conditions which courts will accept as within
the permissive limits of sound public policy is seriously handicapped
by adverse propaganda already forcefully broadcast. The Temporary
National Economic Committee created by Congress in 1938 has in a
sense spiked his guns. After some months of hearing testimony, it has
recommended certain changes in the patent laws, and specifically in
this connection says:
''We recommend that the owner of any patent be required to
grant only unrestrict~d licenses, and that he be not permitted to
impose restrictions upon the buyer in sales of patented articles.
In other words,. the holder of a patent should not be permitted to
restrict a licensee in respect of the amount of any article he may
produce, the price at which he may sell, the purpose for which or
the manner in which he may use the patent or any article produced
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thereunder, or the geographical area within which he may produce or sell such article. There should be a further prohibition
against any other restriction which would tend substantially to lessen competition or to create a monopoly, unless such restriction is
necessary to promote the progress of science and the useful arts." 56
This is an astonishing pronouncement of public policy which repudiates
the greater part of a century of judicial decision. Whether it was really
justified by the evidence is a matter of grave doubt, but it is likely to
be strongly persuasive of judicial notions of public policy hereafter. 57
EFFECT OF INVALIDITY OF CONDITIONS

If an attorney guesses wrong as to what the court's conclusion will
be, the consequences to his client may be startlingly serious. That a
judicially declared invalidity of some condition or restriction should
leave the license in effect without the restriction of that limitation
would, of course, be expected. The patentee who granted the license
subject to the invalid restriction would simply find himself bound by
the other terms of the agreement, without benefit of the restriction.
In a sense, except that the patentee might not have granted the license
at all without the limitation, he will have lost nothing,material by its
invalidity; he merely sought to gain that which legally he could not
have.
In the last few years, however, the courts have developed a tendency which imposes a real risk upon anyone who attaches to a license
contract a condition which turns out to be invalid. If the court holds
the condition improper, the patentee's loss is real and considerable.
In American Lecithin Company v. Warfield Company,5 8 the plaintiff had procured a patent on a process for the prevention of "greying''
in cake chocolate by mixing lecithin with the other ingredients. The
plaintiff patentee had never expressly licensed the defendant to use
his process at all. He had, however, made a practice of not protesting
against the use of the patented process by persons who bought their
lecithin from him. The defendant, who had thus used the process and
bought lecithin from the patentee, began buying from someone else.
The patentee thereupon sued him for infringement, asking an injunction, accounting, and damages. In this case, one might have supposed

c.,

T. N. E.
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 36-37 (1941).
The evidence before the committee is summarized and evaluated by FoLK,
PATENTS AND INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS (1942).
58 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 207, cert. den. 308 U. S. 609, 60 S. Ct.
175 (1940).
56
57
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that the injunction would be issued almost as a matter of course. Granting that any condition obligating the defendant to buy lecithin from
the plaintiff would have been invalid, hence any license to which it was
attached would at once have become an unconditional license, nevertheless in this particular case no license had been granted, conditional or otherwise. On the face of it, the defendant was a clear infringer. The
court, however, denied the plaintiff any relief.
Just what the theory was on which the court denied the relief, the
writer defies anyone to demonstrate. The defendant himself argued
that plaintiff's acquiescence in his use of the process constituted an implied license to use it for the-life of the patent, on condition that he buy
lecithin from the plaintiff; the condition being invalid, the implied
·license remained. The court, however, called this a foolish proposition,
saying that a license for the life of the patent could not possibly be
inferred from the circumstances.69 Hence, it said, there was no license,
either express or implied. The court also flatly repudiated the defendant's suggestion that because of the plaintiff's attempt to mdnopolize
the sale of lecithin he had lost all rights in his patent. The plaintiff did
not, said the court, become an outlaw, nor lose the right which he had
acquired uncle~ the patent law. Apparently, then, in the court's mind,
the plaintiff had a valid patent, the enjoyment of which he had not
lost, and the defendant had no license. Nevertheless, the court's ultimate decision was to refuse the plaintiff any relief by injunction, accounting, or damages. ·
The Supreme Court, in reaching a somewhat similar conclusion in
the later case of Morton Salt Company v. Suppiger Company,6° was
more explicit as to its reasons. Here the plaintiff had a patent on a
machine for putting the proper amount of salt in cans with vegetables
or other canning material. He leased such machines and licensed the
lessees to use them without charge, on condition that they should buy
their salt from him. The circuit court of appeals held this condition to
be valid because it created no tendency to monopoly, and therefore
was not in violation of the Clayton Act. On this particular point, the
Supreme Court disagreed and held the condition to be invalid. Hence
if the plaintiff's action had been against one of his licensees, it would
be understandable that he would have been refused relief, because the
license, stripped of the invalid condition, would have protected the
defendant.
69 In Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U. S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 288 (1937), the
court does seem to infer an implied license from similar facts.
60 314 U.S. 488, 62 S. Ct. 402 (1942), noted 40 M1cH. L. REV. 1266 (1942).
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· In this case, however, the action was not against a licensee, but
against a third· person who was making and selling the patented machine without the slightest pretense of a license from the patentee.
Not only was there no express license from the patentee to the defendant; there was no relationship from which an implied license or a
license "by estoppel" could possibly be deduced. Nevertheless, the
defendant moved for dismissal of the proceedings on the ground that,
granting the validity of the patent, the plaintiff had no right to an
action for infringement. The motion to dismiss was granted by the
trial court, and its action sustained by the Supreme Court, which put
its decision squarely on the ground that the plaintiff-patentee had lost
his right to an injunction against infringement by anyone. In that
sense, the Supreme Court's decision amounted to a declaration that the
plaintiff had lost his patent right, at least so far as actions in equity
were concerned.
The Court said,
"Undoubtedly 'equity does not demand that its suitors shall
have led blameless lives,' 61 but additional considerations must be
taken into account where maintenance of the suit concerns the
public interest as well as the private interests of suitors. Where
the patent is used as a means of restraining competition with the
the patentee's sale of an unpatented product, the successful
prosecution of an infringement suit even against one who is not
a competitor in such sale is a powerful aid to the maintenance of
the attempted monopoly of the unpatented article, and is thus a
contributing factor in thwarting the public policy underlying the
grant of the patent. Maintenance and enlargement of the attempted monopoly of the unpatented article are dependent to
some ext<!nt upon persuading the public of the validity of the
patent, which the infringement suit is intended to establish.
Equity may rightly withhold its assistance from such a use of
the patent by declining to entertain a suit for infringement, and
should do so at least until it is made to appear that the improper
practice has been abandoned and that the consequences of the
misuse of the patent have been dissipated. . . .
"The reasons for barring the prosecution of such a suit
against one who is not a competitor with the patentee in the sale
of the unpatented product are fundamentally the same as those
which preclude an infringement suit against a licensee who has
violated a condition of the license by using with the licensed
61 Citing Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 54 S. Ct. 684 (1934), and Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U. S. 240, 54 S. Ct. 146 (1933).
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machine a competing unpatented article. . . . It is the adverse
effect upon the public interest of a successful infringement suit, in
conjunction with the patentee's course of conduct, which disqualifies him to maintain the suit, regardless of whether the particular
defendant has suffered from the misuse of the patent." 62
A particularly disturbing feature of the case is its suggestion that
this complete loss of value in- the patent might result from a judicial
finding of invalidity of conditions other than those which violate the
Clayton Act. The Supreme Court's final statement was:
"It is unnecessary to decide whether respondent has violated
the Clayton Act, for we conclude that in any event the maintenance of the present suit to restrain petitioner's manufacture or
sale of the alleged infringing machine is contrary to public policy,
and that the district court rightly dismissed the complaint for want
of equity." 63
But, by way of closing this discussion on a more optimistic noteoptimistic to the patentee's hearing-it might be suggested that this
decision does not deny the patentee's right to an action at law for the
recovery of damages. Moreover, the patentee may find some consolation in a decision by the Supreme Court immediately following the
Salt Company case. In B. B. Chemical Company v. Ellis, 64 the facts
were much, the same. The patentee had authorized manufacturers to
use his process on condition that they use only materials furnished by
him. Again the Court said that because of the invalidity of the condition, the right of injunction must be denied. It wound up its decision,
however, by saying:
"Despite this contention, petitioner suggests that it is entitled
to relief because it is now willing to give unconditional licenses to
manufacturers on a royalty basis, which it offers to do. It will be
appropriate to consider petitioner's right to relief when it is able
to show that it has fully abandoned its· present method of restraining competition in the sale of unpatented articles and that
the consequences of that practice have been fully dissipated." 65
314 U. S. at 493-494.
Id. at 494.
64 314 U.S. 495, 62 S. Ct. 406 (1942).
65 Id., 314 U. S. at 498. This is given support by another equity case in a different field, whei:ein the court said, "Numerous authorities support the view that a
suit for recovery is not barred in cases where . . • any wrong done is a thing of the
past, and is collateral to the cause of action asserted and where the relation of the
illegality to the relief sought is indirect and remote..•." Judson v. Buckley, (C. C. A.
2d, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 174 at 180.
62
63

